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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
THE ESTATE OF JUD Y DUMOULIN,
deceased, by and through her Personal
Representative and JOSEPH DUMOULIN,
an individual,

I

Supreme Court Case No. 36828

Plaintiff-Appellant,

I

VS.

CUNA Mutual Group,
an Iowa corporation authorized by the State
of Idaho, Department of Insurance, to
transact business in the State of Idaho,

I

I
I
I
I

Defendant-Respondent.

I

/
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Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada

THE HONERABLE CHERI C. COPSEY, DISTRICT JUDGE

THOMAS V. MAILE, IV, ISB #2378
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone (208) 939- 1000
Attorneys for Appellant

J. KEVIN WEST, ISB #3337
Noah G. Hillen, ISB #7690
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT &
BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 395-8500
Attorneys for Respondent
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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I

A.

Nature of the Case

This is an insurance coverage case. Appellant, Joseph Dumoulin and the Estate of Judy

1

Dumoulin filed the instant breach of contract action against Respondent CUNA Mutual
Insurance Society ("CUNA Mutual"), the insurance company administering Appellant's
Accidental Death & Dismemberment ("AD&Dn) plan, after CUNA Mutual denied AD&D

I

insurance benefits to Appellant. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CUNA
Mutual below and dismissed the case.

B.

Course of the Proceedings

On October 2, 2008, Appellant filed a cause of action against CUNA Mutual alleging
claims for breach of contract and the tort of breach of good faith and fair dealing. R. Vol. 1 at 612; Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial ("Complaint") 1-7. On April 20,2009, CUNA Mutual
I

filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. R. Vol. I at 43; Motion for Summary Judgment at 1.
On June 1,2009, CUNA filed a Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavits of Joseph Dumoulin
and Sheri Arnold ("Motion to Strike"). R. Vol. 1 at 47; Motion to Strike at 1. On July 16,2009,
I

the district court held a hearing on Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. R. Vol. 1 at
I

69; Order on Motion to Strike at 1.
At the summary judgment hearing, the district court granted Respondent's Motion for

I

I

Summary Judgment. Tr. at p. 19 1. 1-2. On July 17, 2009, the district court struck portions of
the affidavits Appellant submitted in opposition to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment.
R. Vol. 1 at 69; Order on Motion to Strike at 1. On July 22, 2009, the district court issued its
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written order granting summary judgment. R. Vol. 1 at 72; Order Granting Summary Judgment
at 1. On July 28, 2009, the district court dismissed Appellant's complaint with prejudice. R.
I

Vol. I at 74; Judgment at 1.
I

On August 20, 2009, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal, R. Vol. 1 at 76; Notice of

I

Appeal at 1; and on August 3 1,2009, Appellant filed an Amended Notice of Appeal, R. Vol. 1 at

I
81; Amended Notice of Appeal at 1.
I

1

I

I
i
j

C.

Statement of Facts

On November 1, 2007, Ms. Dumoulin purchased AD&D insurance through Pioneer
Federal Credit Union. R. Vol. 1 at 13; Complaint and Demand for Jury 6ia1, Ex. A, p. 1. This
Certificate of Insurance, issued by CUNA Mutual, provided $40,000.00 in benefits for accidental
death or accidental dismemberment and covered injuries only. Id.

i
I

!

I

I

The Policy defines "accident" as: "An obcurrence which is unexpected or unforeseen,
either as to its cause or as to its result." R. Vol. 1 at 14; Complaint, Ex. A, p. 2. The Policy
defines "accidental deaty as: "[dleath resulting from an injury, and occurring within 1 year of
the date of the accident causing the injury." Id. The Policy defines "injury, injuries" as:

I

"Bodily damage or harm which: (1) is caused directly by an accident and independently of all
other causes; (b) is effected solely through external means; and (c) occurs while a covered
person's insurance is in force under your certificate." Id.

I

The Policy also contains exclusions, which state: "No benefit will be paid for any loss or
covered injury that: . . . is due to any disease, sickness, bodily or mental illness, or complication
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I

resulting from medical treatment, surgery, pregnancy or childbirth." R. Vol. 1 at 17; Complaint,

Ex. A, p. 5.

iI
1
I
iI

On March 13, 2008, Ms. Dumoulin was admitted to the emergency department of West
Valley Medical Center ("WVMC") with a chief complaint of dyspnea (shortness of breath). R.

Ex. 9, Ex. A, Affidavit of Records Custodian Certifying Records ("Custodian Aff.") at WVMC
00003, 00005, 000013.' Ms. Dumoulin was placed on oxygen as she was having difficulty

I
I

breathing. R. Ex. 1, Ex. 1 at 10-1 1; Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion for Summary

I

Judgment ("Counsel Aff."), Ex. 1, Plaintiffs' Answers to First Set of Interrogatories and

I

I
I

Responses to Requests for Production of Documents ("First Interrogatory Responses"), pp. 10-

11. Ms. Dumoulin had multiple risk factors that would predispose her to a large variety of
illnesses that could manifest as dyspnea. R. Ex. 9, Ex. A; Custodian Aff. at WVMC 00002.

I

Ms. Dumoulin also had a history of depression, paranoid schizophrenia, bipolar, manic
I

I

depression, and other psychotic disorders. R. Ex. 1, Ex. 1 at 15; Counsel Aff., Ex. 1, First
Interrogatory Responses at 15. Ms. Dumoulin also complained of the flu when she was admitted
to the hospital. Id.
Upon admission to the hospital, Ms. Dumoulin reported that she had pneumonia three
weeks prior to admission from which she had not completely recovered. R. Ex. 9, Ex. A;
Custodian Aff. at WVMC 000023. Ms. Dumoulin's chest CT scan indicated a possible "diffuse

'

I

An excerpt ofthe relevant medical records from Ms. Dumoulin's hospital stay is attached to Exhibit 9 of the record
on appeal, the Affidavit of Records Custodian Certifying Records. The documents are Bates numbered WVMC
00001-00240, and are referenced by Bates number in the text above.
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atypical pneumonia concerning for maybe a fungal infection, as well as nodules concerning for
possible malignancy." R. Ex. 9, Ex. A; Custodian Aff. at WVMC 00003-00004.
On March 16, 2008, Ms. Dumoulin was found on the floor without a pulse or
respirations. R. Ex. 9, Ex. A, Custodian Aff at WVMC 00004. Ms. Dumoulin was resuscitated,
intubated, and placed on a ventilator. Id. A CT scan of the chest indicated a "worsening
progression of [Ms. Dumoulin's] atypical infection." Id. A brain CT scan revealed a "global
anoxic brain injury." Id. Ms. Dumoulin was declared dead on March 17, 2008. Id. Ms.
Dumoulin's autopsy revealed that she died from pre-existing bronchopneumonia with
superimposed aspiration pneumonia. R. Ex. 9, Ex. A; Custodian Aff. at WVMC 00022-00027.
Appellant's expert, Dr. Bekanich, concluded that Ms. Dumoulin's death waspreventable
and that the attending physicians andlor the hospital staff were negligent in the treatment of Ms.
Dumoulin. Though CUNA Mutual believes this assertion is incorrect, it was accepfkd as true for
purposes of CUNA Mutual's Motion for Summary Judgment. R. Ex. 2 at 5; Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 5. Appellant did not bring a medical negligence
action against WVMC or any of Ms. Dumoulin's health care providers.
On June 13,2008, Appellant's counsel mailed a Proof of Loss Claim to defendant CUNA
Mutual, demanding payment of the proceeds under the terms of the subject policy. R. Vol. 1 at
20; Complaint, Ex. B. On June 18, 2008, defendant CUNA Mutual denied liability for payment
of the proceeds under the AD&D policy because the certificate only covered losses due to death
or dismemberment caused by accidental means, and losses due to illness or medical conditions
were not covered by the certificate. R. Vol. 1 at 24; Complaint, Ex. C.
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The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CUNA Mutual, holding the
Policy provision excluding coverage for any loss due to any disease, sickness, bodily or mental
illness or complication resulting from medial treatment, surgery, pregnancy or childbirth, was
unambiguous and applicable to the instant case. Tr. at 16-17. The district court further held that
the Appellant introduced no evidence below that was material to the court's decision showing
Ms. Dumoulin's death was an accident. Tr. at 17-18.
11.
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the district court correctly grant CUNA Mutual's motion for summary
judgment and hold that Ms. Dumoulin's death was related to either medical
treatment or a pre-existing illness, and therefore falls within the Policy exclusion
language?

2.

Is CUNA Mutual entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho
Code Sections 41- 1839(4) and 12-123 because Appellant filed the instant appeal
frivolously and defended it without foundation?
111.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a ruling on a summary judgment motion, this Court employs the same
standard used by the district court. Sprinkler Irrigation Co. Inc. v. John Deere Ins. Co., Inc., 139
Idaho 691,695,85 P.3d 667, 671 (2004) (citing Baker v. Sullivan, 132 Idaho 746, 748,979 P.2d
619, 621 (1999)).

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
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any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P.
56(c).
I
I

I

When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must determine whether
the evidence, when construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, presents a
genuine issue of material fact or shows that the moving party is not entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Kiebert v. Goss, 144 Idaho 225,228, 159 P.3d 862, 865 (2007) (citing Pincock v.

I

Pocatello Gold & Copper Mining Co., I00 Idaho 325, 328, 597 P.2d 21 1, 214 (1979)). The
moving party bears the burden of proving the absence of material facts. Id. (citing Hei v. Holzer,

I1
I
I

i

I39 Idaho 81, 85, 73 P.3d 94, 98 (2003)). Once the moving party establishes the absence of a

,

genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show the existence of
a genuine issue of material fact. Id. A nonmoving party must come forward with evidence by

P

way of affidavit or otherwise that contradicts the evidence submitted by the moving party, and
that establishes the existence of a material issue of disputed fact. Id. (citing Zehm v. Assoc.
Logging Contractors, Inc., 116 Idaho 349, 350,775 P.2d 1191, 1192 (1988)).

IV.
ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment below and award
CUNA Mutual attorney fees on appeal.
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'I

A.

The district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of CUNA
Mutual and held that Ms. Dumoulin's death was related to her medical
treatment or a pre-existing illness, and therefore fell within the Policy
exclusion language.

Absent ambiguity, an insurance policy is governed by the same rules as applied to
contracts generally. Gordon v. Three Rivers Agency, Inc., 127 Idaho 539, 542, 903 P.2d 128,
131 (1995) (citations omitted). If ambiguity is present, however, the court will consider the
uneven bargaining power between the parties and will construe the ambiguous provisions in
favor of the insured. Mut. ofEnumclaw Ins. Co. v. Pedersen, 133 Idaho 135, 138, 983 P.2d 208,
21 1 (1999) (citations omitted). To determine ambiguity, the court must ask whether the policy is
reasonably susceptible to conflicting interpretations. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Talbot, 133 Idaho 428,
432, 987 ~ . 2 6 1 0 4 3 ,1046 (1999) (citations omitted). If ambiguity is found, the court must
determine "what a reasonable person would have understood the language to mean." Id.; see also

Martinez v. Idaho Counties Reciprocal Mgmt. Prog., 134 Idaho 247, 999 P.2d 902 (2000);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mocaby, 133 Idaho 593,990 P.2d 1204.
1.

The instant Policy is unambiguous.

The district court correctly, as a threshold matter, determined that the Policy was
unambiguous. The district court noted that "the fact that someone can posit a different
interpretation in and of itself does not meet the [ambiguity] requirement. The question is
whether the interpretation is a reasonable interpretation." Tr. at 15. When determining that the
Policy was unambiguous, the district court examined the language of the Policy exclusion, and
the definitions of "injury, "accident," and "accidental death" under the Policy. Tr. at 16-17.
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The exclusion at issue in the instant Policy read as follows: "6.01 Exclusions: No benefit
will be paid for any loss or covered injury that: . . . i) is due to any disease, sickness, bodily or
mental illness, or complication resulting from medical treatment, surgery, pregnancy or
childbirth." R. Vol. 1 at 17; Complaint, Ex. A (emphasis in original). Under the Policy, an
"injury" or "injuries" are defined as: Bodily damage or harm which: (a) is caused directly by an

accident and independently of all other causes; (b) is effected solely through external means;
and (c) occurs while a coveredperson S insurance is in force under your certificate. R. Vol. 1 at
14; Complaint, Ex. A (emphasis added). The Policy defines an "accident" as: "An occurrence
which is unexpected or unforeseen, either as to its cause or as to its result." Id. The Policy also
defines "accidental death" as: "Death resulting from an injury, and occurring within 1 year of the
date of the accident causing the injury." Id.
Appellant argues that the term "medical or surgical treatment" is ambiguous because it
allows for two reasonable constructions: "One construction could mean that all medical
treatment, no matter how skillfully or unskillfully performed, is covered by that phrase." App.
Opening Br. at 10. "Another construction, [sic] could mean that improper treatment, or
malpractice, which is an accident, is not included within the meaning of 'medical treatment.""

Id. Appellant, however, does not provide any citation to authority when arguing these two
interpretations are reasonable. A party waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority or
argument is lacking. Kootenai Med. Ctr. ex re1 Teresa K. v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare,
147 Idaho 872, 880,216 P.3d 630, 638 (2009) (citing State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259,263, 923
P.2d 966,970 (1996)). Therefore, this Court should not address this argument on appeal.
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I

Furthermore, the plain and ordinary meaning of the term "medical or surgical treatment"
does not support Appellant's constructions.

Appellant relies upon the case Dinkowitz v.

Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 216 A.2d 613 (1966), which required the court to determine
j

i

whether accidental death and dismemberment insurance with exclusions for an accidental death
covered payment for death arising from medical negligence. However, that case resolves the
instant controversy in favor of Respondent. In Dinkowitz, two of the three insurance policies at
issue excluded payment under the policy "if such death results . . . directly or indirectly from
bodily or mental infirmity or disease in any form, or medical or surgical treatment therefore."

Id. at 614 (emphasis added). The third policy contained an exclusion for "any loss which results
from or is caused, directly or indirectly, by . . . disease 9r bodily or mental infirmity, or medical

or surgical beatment thereof." Id. at 614-15 (emphasis added).

,

The court noted that "clear basic terms and pdicular provisions of an insurance contract
may not be disregarded at will and a new contract judicially made for the parties." Id. at 615
(citing Linden Motor Freight Co., Inc., v. Travelers Ins. Co., 193 A.2d 217, 225 (1963)). This
principle is also followed in Idaho: Where a court finds policy language unambiguous, the court
construes the policy as written, "and the [clourt by construction cannot create a liability not
assumed by the insurer nor make a new contract for the parties, or one different from that plainly
intended, nor add words to the contract of insurance to either create or avoid liability."

Armstrong v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 147 Idaho 67,69,205 P.3d 1203, 1205 (2009) (citations
omitted).
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Much like the instant case, the plaintiff in Dinkowitz argued that "the average policyholder might well realize that accidental death benefits would not be paid by the insurer for a
death resulting from unexpected contingencies during the course of proper medical treatment, he
would expect the additional compensation to be payable if death resulted solely from medical
I

malpractice."

216 A.2d at 615-16. The Dinkowitz court, however, found that the policy

I

language was not ambiguous, and instead enforced the plain meaning of the words of the

I
I

contract. The court held that "[tlhe average policy holder could not reasonably reach a
conclusion of coverage in the particular circumstances here in the light of and having in mind the

I

limiting language of the insuring clause." Id. at 618 (internal quotations omitted) (citation
omitted).
In reaching the above conclusion, the Dinkowih court relied upon the definitions of
medical and surgical treatment. "Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1958) defines
'treatment' as 'Act, manner, or an instance of treating, especially of treating a person or animal, a
patient, subject, or a sub-stance, as in processing; handling; usage; as unkind treatment of a child;
to require medical treatment."' Id. at 616. The court also noted that "'[m]edical and surgical
treatment mean what is done by a physician of any recognized type or by a surgeon in
diagnosing a bodily ailment and seeking to alleviate or cure it."' Id. (citing Barkerding v. Aetna

L+ Ins. Co., 82 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1936)). Based on the definitions of medical and surgical
treatment, the Dinkowitz court determined the policies were unambiguous: "Adoption of the
plaintiffs contention in the light of the limiting language of the insuring clause here would
render meaningless the words by which the parties expressed their bargain and read into the

I

-
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contracts something which is not there."

Id. at 618 (internal quotations omitted) (citation

omitted). The same result is required in the instant case. The Policy language is clear and
unambiguous.
2.

The plain language of the Policy excludes coverage in the instant case.

Because the Policy is unambiguous, the Policy is governed by the same rules as applied
to contracts generally. Gordon, I27 Idaho at 542, 903 P.2d at 131. General contract principles
provide that if a contract's terms are clear and unambiguous, the contract's meaning and legal
effect are questions of law and that the meaning of the contract and intent of the parties must be
determined from the plain meaning of the contract's own words. Albee v. Judy, 136 Idaho 226,
31 P.3d 248 (2001) (holding that the plain language of the contractpt issue was unambiguous
and as such, the intent of the parties must be determined from the plain meaning of the contract);

City of Idaho Falls v. The Home Indemnity Co., 126 Idaho 604, 888 P.2d 383 (1995) (holding
policy terms were clear and unambiguous and, therefore, the determination of the contract's
meaning and intent of the parties must be determined from the plain meaning of the words of the
contract).
Based on the unambiguous nature of the policy exclusion at issue, the district court
determined, as a matter of law, the meaning of the exclusion provision. The plain language of
the Policy excludes coverage for any injury due to any disease, sickness, bodily or mental illness,
or complication resulting from medical treatment.

The Policy only provides coverage for

injuries or death caused directly by an accident, which must be unexpected or unforeseen, and
independent of all other causes.
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In a case similar to the one at issue, Leslie v. LC. Pemey Life Ifis. Co., the beneficiary
made a claim for coverage under two accidental death policies insuring her husband. 138 Idaho
305, 62 P.3d 1101 (2003). The two policies covered injuries caused by an "accident" occurring
"directly and independently of all other causes." Id. at 306,62 P.3d at 1102. Additionally, both
policies had exclusions that stated that "[nlo benefit shall be paid for Injury that . . . is due to
disease, bodily or mental infirmity, or medical or surgical treatment of these." Id. Six months
after a snowmobile accident, Mr. Leslie was admitted into the hospital and diagnosed with
potential bowel entrapment in a ventral hernia related to the snowmobile accident. Id. No hernia
or bowel blockage was located, but the appendix was removed. Id. Two days after the surgery,
Mr. Leslie died due in part to the post-operative removal of a nasogastric tube. Id. J.C. Penney
denied coverage for both claims, because the injury leading to death was excluded by the policy
as a disease or bodily infirmity or related to a surgical procedure. Id. at 306, 62 P.3d at 1102.
The case went to a jury, which found that there was no coverage under the policy. Id. at 308,62
P.3d at 1104. This Court upheld the exclusion of coverage for injury due to disease or bodily
infirmity and affirmed the decision of the district court. Id.
The same result is compelled by the facts here.

As discussed above, the policy

exclusions at issue unambiguously provide that Mr. Dumoulin would not receive benefits under
the policy if Ms. Dumoulin passed away from sickness or disease, or from complications arising
from medical care or treatment. In fact, it is undisputed that Ms. Dumoulin died from sickness
and disease, or, alternatively, from complications of the medical care she received at West
Valley Medical Center, as noted in the autopsy report.
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Furthermore, even if this Court were to find the phrase medical or surgical treatment to
be ambiguous, and M e r infer medical negligence constituted an accident, the plain language of
the Policy still excludes coverage for Ms. Dumoulin's death. As the district court noted, "even if

I were to assume it was an accident, it was not independent of all other causes." Tr. at 17. Ms.
Dumoulin's autopsy revealed that she died from pre-existing bronchopneumonia with
superimposed aspiration pneumonia. R. Ex. 9, Ex. A; Custodian Aff. at WVMC 00022-00027.
The Policy excludes coverage for any injury "due to any disease, sickness, bodily or mental
illness, or complication resulting from medical treatment [or] surgery."

R. Vol. 1 at 17;

Complaint, Ex. A (emphasis added). The exclusion language is written in the disjunctive. Even
if medical malpractice does not constitute medical treatment, Appellant has failed submit any
evidence below, or account for the fact that the Policy also excludes coverage for any injury due
to an illness such as bronchopneumonia with superimposed aspiration pneumonia. Furthermore,
Appellant failed to submit any evidence below establishing that medical malpractice was the
independent cause of Ms. Dumoulin's death, as required by the definition of injury under the
Policy. R. Vol. I at 14; Complaint, Ex. A. As the district court noted: "The bottom line here is
there's nothing in the record to show that the reason that [Ms. Dumoulin] died was anything
other than a complication arising out of or resulting from the medical treatment of her
pneumonia."2 Tr. at 18. Therefore, this Court should affirm the decision of the district court
below.

The Court may also take note that Appellant contends that the Affidavit of Joseph Dumoulin provides the court
with the factual medical history of Ms. Dumoulin. See App. Br. At 6. However, much of the Affidavit of Joseph
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B.

I
1
I

CUNA Mutual is entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to
Idaho Code Sections 41-1839(4) and 12-123 because Appellant filed the
instant appeal frivolously and defended it without foundation.

The availability of attorney fees in insurance cases is governed by statute. Idaho Code
section 41-1839(4) provides the authority for an award of attorney fees when a court finds that
the case was "brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation."

Howard v. Oregon Mut. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 214, 219, 46 P.3d 510, 515 (2002). The statute
i

provides a basis for an award of attorney fees to either the insured or the insurer. Id
Idaho Code sections 41-1839(4) and 12-123 are the exclusive methods by which a court

I
!

may grant attorney fees when a dispute arises under the irisurance policy between an insurer and
insured. TriniQ Universa$Ins.Co. v. Kirsling, 139 Idaho 89,95,73 P.3d 102, 108 (2003). Idaho

,

Code Section 41-1839(4) states in relevant part:
P

I

Notwithstanding any other provision of statute to the
contrary, this section and section 12-123, Idaho Code, shall
provide the exclusive remedy for the award of statutory attorney's
fees in all actions between insureds and insurers involving disputes
arising under policies of insurance. Provided, attorney's fees may
be awarded by the court when it finds, from the facts presented to
it that a case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation.
In addition, Idaho Code Section 12-123 states that a court may award attorney fees to the
prevailing party if the case was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or
without foundation.

Dumoulin in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, which is Exhibit 6 to the Record on
Appeal, was struck as inadmissible by the district court below, including the allegation that there was no course of
treatment by the hospital. R. Vol. 1 at 70; Order Granting Motion to Strike Affidavits at 2.
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Frivolous conduct means conduct of a party to a civil action or of
his counsel of record that satisfies either of the following:

i

I

I

I.C.

(a)

It obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure
another party to the civil action;

(b)

It is not supported in fact or warranted under existing law
and cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an
extension, modification or reversal of existing law.

9 12-123.
The instant appeal was frivolously filed and pursued by Appellant. The language

l

and terms contained within the Policy at issue did not provide any support for Appellant's
I
I,

contention that Ms. Dumoulin's death was a covered occurrence. The applicable terms

1

and exclusions contained in the Policy were clear and unambiguous. The plain meaning
of the terms of the Policy provided that the death of Ms. Dumoulin was not covered

1

under the Policy.
Appellant's appeal was predicated on factual evidence that the district court
struck from the record below, and Appellant merely asks this Court to reweight the
I

district court's decision below. Appellant's appeal had no basis in law or fact and was so
plainly without merit that it should be deemed frivolous, unreasonable, and without
foundation.

v.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, CUNA Mutual respectfully requests this Court affirm the
district court's grant of summary judgment below.

-
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

a

day of February, 2010.

HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT
& BLANTON, P.A.

ah G. Hillen - Of the Firm
ttorneys for Respondent
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

I

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the /q day of February, 2010, I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF, by the method indicated below, and
addressed to each of the following:
/

/

&

I

I

Thomas V. Maile, IV
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
Eagle, ID 83616
Attorney for Appellant
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